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Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Uniform
Trust Code – Colorado’s Approach
Darla L. Daniel*
Colorado enacted the Colorado Uniform Trust Code (“CUTC”) in
2018, with an effective date of January 1, 2019.1 This article discusses the
approach Colorado has taken to alternative dispute resolution in the
CUTC, and highlights approaches taken by other states in this area.
I. COLORADO.
Colorado opted to include both of the Uniform Trust Code’s provisions regarding the use of alternative dispute resolution in trusts: section
111, authorizing parties to use nonjudicial settlement agreements to resolve disputes regarding trusts,2 and section 816(23), granting the trustee
the power to “resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the
trust or its administration by mediation, arbitration, or other procedure
for alternate dispute resolution.”3 In addition to these uniform sections,
the CUTC also includes its own section 15-5-113:
CUTC 15-5-113. Alternate dispute resolution.
(1) A settlor may designate in the trust instrument a method
of nonjudicial alternate dispute resolution that is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except on a ground that exists at
law or in equity for the invalidation of a trust. Such methods of
nonjudicial dispute resolution may include rules of notice and
procedure. The settlor may bind beneficiaries and assigns to
the methods of dispute resolution.
(2) A method of nonjudicial dispute resolution provided by
the settlor in the trust instrument does not preclude the court’s
authority to enter an order of alternate dispute resolution,
* Centennial, Colorado. The author wishes to thank Connie Tromble Eyster for her
assistance with this article.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-5-101 (2019).
2 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-5-816(1)(w); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(23). The official
comments to UTC section 816(23) state that “[t]he drafters of this Code encourage the
use of such alternate methods for resolving disputes. Arbitration is a form of nonjudicial
settlement agreement authorized by Section 111 . . . Settlors wishing to encourage use of
alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide it. For sample language, see American
Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for Wills and Trusts (1995).”
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which does not eliminate or negate the method of nonjudicial
dispute resolution provided by the settlor except on a ground
that exists at law or in equity for the invalidation of a trust.4
The CUTC defines “alternate dispute resolution” (ADR) as a method
of nonjudicial dispute resolution “which may include but is not limited
to a method prescribed pursuant to the [Colorado] Uniform Arbitration
Act.”5 This is intended to encompass a broad range of methods, including but not limited to mediation and binding or non-binding arbitration.
Importantly, section 113 places limits on the enforceability of a settlor’s
directive.
First, section 15-5-113(1) provides that a settlor’s directive regarding the use of ADR will not be enforceable if the subject matter of the
dispute is the validity of the trust instrument itself.6 Here, the CUTC
took concepts from Colorado’s Uniform Arbitration Act (CUAA), stating that a method of ADR designated by a settlor in a trust instrument
is “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except on a ground that exists at
law or in equity for the invalidation of a trust.”7 Grounds for the invalidation of a trust under the CUTC include the settlor’s lack of capacity
or lack of intent to create a trust, and for a non-charitable trust, lack of a
definite beneficiary;8 having an unlawful purpose or being contrary to
public policy;9 and fraud, duress and undue influence.10 This approach is
consistent with established case law holding that issues of validity, such
as the decedent’s capacity to make a will or trust, the genuineness of the
will or trust, or execution formalities, are not proper subjects for
arbitration.11
Second, under section 15-5-113(2), a settlor’s directive does not preclude a court’s power to order the parties to engage in a method of
4

COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-5-113.
Id. § 15-5-103(2).
6 Id. § 15-5-113(1).
7 Id. See also id. § 15-5-103(2) (referring to Colorado’s Uniform Arbitration Act,
COLO. REV STAT. § 13-22-201).
8 Id. § 15-5-402.
9 Id. § 15-5-404.
10 Id. § 15-5-406.
11 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Anderson, 575 S.W.3d 144 (Ark. Ct. App 2019) (refusing to
enforce an arbitration clause in a trust instrument where issues of fraud were present); In
re Jacobovitz’s Will, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1968). In Jacobovitz, four of
the estate’s 16 distributees had agreed to arbitration by a Rabbinical Court, including as
to the will’s validity. The court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement, stating that
the “probate of an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased
. . . can not be the subject of arbitration under the Constitution and the law as set forth by
the legislature of the State of New York and any attempt to arbitrate such issue is against
public policy.”
5
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ADR that “does not eliminate or negate” the method provided by the
settlor.12
Third, section 15-5-113 is a default provision under the CUTC, not
a mandatory provision – and one of the mandatory provisions in the
CUTC is that a court retains the power “to take such action and exercise
such jurisdiction not inconsistent with a settlor’s intent as may be necessary in the interests of justice.”13 Thus, if the terms of a settlor’s directive were so unreasonable as to be contrary to the interests of justice, a
court could refuse to enforce part or all of them, and order the parties to
engage in a different method of ADR that is reasonable and consistent
with settlor intent.
Colorado has no reported case law on the enforceability of a settlor’s directive for ADR in a trust. The CUAA, and cases interpreting it,
will likely bear on a future Colorado court’s interpretation of section 155-113.14 Colorado-specific practicalities will also likely bear on a future
Colorado court’s interpretation of section 15-5-113.
In Colorado, the City and County of Denver is the only county in
the state with a designated probate court.15 Some of the larger counties
have a dedicated probate registrar, but in many counties, judges are assigned various dockets, including general civil, criminal, and trust and
estate cases, on a rotating basis. For litigants in contested trust disputes,
this means they may or may not get a judge with expertise in trust and
estate law — and for lawyers, it means that outcomes for clients can be
hard to predict. In addition, over the past decade, some of the busier
courts, burdened with exploding mental health dockets and an evergreater lack of financial and staffing resources, now send trust and estate litigants to mediation first, as a matter of course, having determined
this is a more efficient and effective way of resolving fact-sensitive disputes involving family dysfunction and high emotions. The CUTC’s recognition of a settlor’s ability to bind beneficiaries to a method of dispute
resolution was a compromise public policy position arrived at by mem12

COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-5-113(2) (2019).
Id. § 15-5-105(2)(m).
14 Id. § 13-22-206.
. . . (2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has
been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate
is enforceable.
(4) If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that
a controversy is not subject to, an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the court, unless
the court otherwise orders.
15 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
13
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bers of the Colorado trust and estate bar – many of whom expressed
widely varying opinions about the relative merits of ADR, and specific
concerns about binding arbitration – but who also recognized the practical limitations facing Colorado courts.
II. OTHER STATES.
Case law on the enforceability of settlor directives for ADR in
other states has gone both ways. Several states now have statutes addressing this issue. One point on which many cases turn is the interpretation of the term “agreement” as used in the state’s arbitration code,
and whether this term is broad enough to encompass a settlor’s directive
for ADR in a trust.
In Rachal v. Reitz, the trust provided that “I intend that as to any
dispute of any kind involving this Trust or any of the parties or persons
concerned herewith (e.g., beneficiaries, Trustees), arbitration as provided herein shall be the sole and exclusive remedy . . . . Judgment on
any arbitration award pursuant hereto shall be binding and enforceable
on all parties.”16 The beneficiary, Reitz, sued the trustee, Rachal, alleging misappropriation of assets and failure to provide accountings.
Rachal then moved to compel arbitration. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision, and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the Texas Arbitration Act requires a written agreement to
arbitrate, and no “contract” existed between the parties. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, finding that a) the meaning of “agreement”
under the Texas Arbitration Act is broader than “contract,” and could
encompass a trust instrument; b) the court’s fundamental duty is to
honor settlor intent, and c) the fact that Reitz had previously accepted
benefits from the trust constituted his assent to its terms, and therefore
the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel applied, and it would be “incongruent” to hold a trustee to a trust’s specific terms, but not hold the
beneficiary to the same.17
Conversely, in In re Calomiris, the District of Columbia Supreme
Court came to the exact opposite conclusion, holding that the meaning
16 Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013). For more in-depth treatment of
this case, the enforceability of settlor directives for arbitration, and model clauses from
ACTEC’s 2006 Arbitration Task Force Report and other sources, see Steven D. Baker,
Rachal v. Reitz and the Efficacy and Implementation of Mandatory Arbitration Provisions
in Trust, 9 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 191 (2017); see also Arbitration Task Force
Report, AM. COLL. OF TR. & EST. COUNSEL FOUND. (2006), https://www.mnbar.org/docs/
default-source/sections/actec-arbitration-task-force-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
17 Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 844-45, 847, 849.
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of “contract” under its arbitration code was not broad enough to include
a trust instrument.18
The Arizona Trust Code now states that a trust “may provide
mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons or among interested persons
with regard to the administration or distribution of the trust.”19 This
statute negated a 2006 decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which
had held that a mandatory arbitration clause in a trust instrument was
not enforceable, as it could not be used to deprive a trust beneficiary of
his right to access the courts.20
The Florida Probate Code also now states that “[a] provision in a
will or trust requiring the arbitration of disputes, other than disputes of
the validity of all or part of a will or trust, between or among the beneficiaries and a fiduciary under the will or trust, or any combination of
such persons or entities, is enforceable,” and that such a provision is
presumed to require binding arbitration unless the document states otherwise.21 In addition, the statute provides that if an arbitration under the
Florida Probate Code is governed by Florida’s Arbitration Code, then
the arbitration provision in the trust “shall be treated as an agreement”
for purposes of applying the arbitration code.22
The Ohio Trust Code mirrors the language used in Florida’s
731.401, but excludes testamentary trusts, and does not include the
“shall be treated as an agreement” language present in the Florida
statute.23

18

In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409 (D.C. 2006).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2019). Arizona’s Trusts, Estates and Protective Proceedings Code also provides that a court may order arbitration or other methods
of ADR to resolve disputes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1108.
20 Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); superseded
by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205.
21 FLA. STAT. § 731.401 (2019).
22 Id.
23 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5802.05 (LexisNexis 2019).
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